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The Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2016 was awarded to Oliver Hart and Bengt 
Holmström for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. Oliver Hart was born in 
1948 in London. He studied mathematics at King’s College in Cambridge and economics at 
Warwick, and did his PhD at Princeton in 1974. He worked at LSE and MIT before going to 
Harvard University in 1993. Bengt Holmström was born in Finland in 1949. He studied 
mathematics in Helsinki and Operations Research at Stanford University where he also did 
his PhD at the Graduate School of Business. He worked at Northwestern and Yale University 
before moving to MIT in 1994. 
Contract Theory analyses the optimal design of incentive schemes (“contracts”) that 
induce the involved parties to behave more efficiently. It is closely related to mechanism 
design theory, for which Leonid Hurwicz,  Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson received the Nobel 
Prize in 2007. While mechanism design theory is mostly interested in allocation mechanisms 
that involve many agents (such as markets, auctions, tax systems, etc.), contract theory 
focuses on situations in which only a few parties interact with each other (often just two). 
Contract Theory deals with a fundamental problem of economic co-operation. Two 
(or more) parties can jointly generate a surplus in addition to what each of them can 
generate on their own. The amount of the surplus depends on the actions that each of the 
parties take. The problem is that each party has an incentive to behave opportunistically, 
i.e., to maximize its own payoff rather than the joint surplus.  If the parties could write a 
complete contingent contract that specifies the actions that each of them has to take in 
every possible state of the world and if this contract could be enforced by the courts, then 
the solution to this problem would be trivial. The parties would write a contract that 
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obligates them to take exactly those actions that maximize the joint surplus in each possible 
state of the world and then share this surplus in some way between them. If a party deviates 
from the prescribed behavior, it has to pay a penalty that is sufficiently high to guarantee 
that everybody honors the terms of the contract.  
Unfortunately, in the real world it is often impossible to write complete contingent 
contracts, e.g. because the actions of some parties are not observable (“moral hazard”) or 
because the actions or the different states of the world cannot be described and verified to a 
third party such as the courts (“incomplete contracts”). In these situations it is still possible 
to write contracts, but these contracts cannot enforce the desired behavior directly, they 
rather have to offer incentives that induce the parties indirectly to behave more efficiently. 
This could be financial incentives, career concerns, or incentives that are provided by the 
allocation of control and property rights. 
Hart and Holmström developed canonical models for the analysis of the optimal 
design of incentive mechanisms. Due to their contributions we now have a much better 
understanding of the incentive effects of contracts and how optimal incentive mechanisms 
should be designed. There is a broad range of possible applications of these models. They 
include the optimal design of incentive schemes for managers and workers, the optimal 
financial structure of a firm, the optimal design of hierarchies and decision structures in 
organizations, and the optimal allocation of property rights. A large literature on contract 
theory grew out of their work that cannot possibly be summarized in this short review. A 
good overview of this literature is provided by the text book of Bolton and Dewatripont 
(2005) and the anthology edited by Aghion et al. (2016). 
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In this short paper I will first discuss Bengt Holmström’s work on optimal incentive 
schemes with moral hazard and then Oliver Hart’s work on incomplete contracts and the 
optimal allocation of property rights. For these contributions they were awarded the Nobel 
Memorial Prize. Both authors have made many more important contributions that I can 
mention only briefly at the end of this review.  
The work of Bengt Holmström and Oliver Hart is conceptually quite different, but 
they both start out from the same problem. This problem was raised by the famous 
“Informativeness Principle” first established by Holmström (1979) and refined and stated 
more rigorously by Grossman and Hart (1983). This principle (to be discussed in more detail 
below) implies that the shape of the optimal incentive scheme in a standard moral hazard 
problem is incredibly complex and highly sensitive to small changes in the (unobservable) 
beliefs of the contracting parties about the probabilities of the possible states of the world. 
The theory yields no robust predictions on the shape of the optimal incentive scheme. This 
problem is clearly pointed out in a joint survey article that Hart and Holmström (1987) 
presented at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in 1985: 
“Indeed, the economic credibility of the contractual approach may be called into 
question when, as often happens, optimal contracts become monstrous state-
contingent prescriptions (p. 74). …  
… The main [problem] is its sensitivity to distributional assumptions. It manifests itself 
in an optimal sharing rule that is complex, responding to the slightest changes in the 
information content of the outcome x. Such `fine-tuning´ appears unrealistic. In the 
real world incentive schemes do show variety, but not the degree produced by the 
basic theory (p. 90).”  
5 
 
Hart and Holmström went out to solve this problem in different ways. Hart limits contractual 
complexity by introducing additional enforcement constraints that are exogenously given. 
He assumes that the parties cannot enforce complex contingencies because these 
contingencies cannot be described in a contract or they cannot be verified to a court. 
Furthermore, the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate their initial contract. This is the 
“incomplete contracts approach” of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). 
Holmström went in the opposite direction. He derives simple and more realistic contracts 
endogenously as the solution to a highly complex dynamic programming problem.  
Holmström and Milgrom (1987) show that if the agent has a very rich action space, then the 
optimal contract must be linear in an aggregate measure of the agent’s performance.  
 
II. Optimal Incentive Schemes with Moral Hazard 
In the 1960s and 70s a literature on moral hazard in insurance and labor markets developed, 
dealing with the inefficiencies that arise if the insurance company cannot observe the effort 
spent by the insuree or if a firm cannot observe the effort of a worker.
1
 This literature 
assumes that the types of contracts that are traded are exogenously given.  In contrast, 




                                                          
1
 Arrow (1963, 1968), Pauly (1968). See Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a short survey on the history of the 
theory of incentives.  
2
 The term “moral hazard” has been used in the insurance industry for more than a century. It refers to the 
problem that a person who bought insurance against an accident is less inclined to invest proper care into 
preventing the accident. Thus, the probability of the accident is not exogenous but depends on the amount of 
insurance that was bought. Hart and Holmström (1987) define “moral hazard” as a contractual situation in 
which an asymmetry of information arises after the contract has been signed. In contrast, there is “adverse 
selection” if there is an informational asymmetry at the contracting stage already. Thus, with moral hazard the 
parties are symmetrically informed when they write the contract and have the common interest to maximize 
the joint surplus, no matter how the bargaining power is allocated. A typical example of moral hazard is a 
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He studied this fundamental problem in a principal-agent model in which the 
principal cannot observe the actions taken by the agent but only some noisy signal. The 
principal wants to maximize her profits while the agent is rather interested in maximizing his 
own utility. As a leading example, consider the case where the principal is the owner of a 
firm and the agent is her manager. The manager has to exert non-observable effort to 
increase profits. The principal only observes a noisy signal of the manager’s effort such as 
the firm’s profit which depends on the manager’s effort but also on other factors that are 
often stochastic. This model is known today as a standard principal-agent problem with 
hidden action.
3
 If both parties are risk neutral there is a simple solution to this problem. The 
principal offers a contract to the agent that makes the agent residual claimant on the margin 
of the firm’s profits, i.e. she sells the store to the agent (a “management buyout”). In this 
case the agent fully internalizes all the costs and benefits of his actions and chooses an effort 
level that maximizes total surplus. However, in the real world the parties are not risk 
neutral.
4
  The agent, in particular, is risk averse because he cannot diversify his human 
capital that has to be invested in one firm only.
5
 For this reason the agent wants to be 
insured against fluctuations of his wage. His most preferred contract would be a fixed wage 
contract. However, if he receives a fixed wage, he has no incentive to spend any effort. Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
situation where the agent has to take an action after signing the contract. The action affects the principal’s 
payoff, but the principal cannot observe it directly, she only observes a noisy signal (“hidden action”). Another 
moral hazard problem arises if the agent receives some private information after signing the contract that 
determines which action he should take. The principal observes the action but does not know the information 
on which the choice of the action is based (“hidden information”).  
3
 A similar model was developed independently by Shavell (1979). Mirrlees (1975) worked on the principal-
agent problem with hidden action in the early 1970s. He points to some important technical problems that are 
discussed below. 
4
 Another problem with this solution is that the agent may be unable to buy the firm because he is cash 
constrained and cannot finance a management buyout because of limited liability. Innes (1990) considers a 
model in which the agent is risk neutral but wealth constrained. In this model there is a tradeoff between 
offering better incentives and reducing the rent that has to be paid to the agent because the agent shares only 
in the gains but not in the losses that the firm may make. If the slope of the optimal incentives scheme can 
neither be negative nor steeper than 1, then the optimal contract is a debt contract.  
5
 The assumption of risk neutrality is less problematic for the principal. If the firm is a joint stock company 
owned by shareholders with optimally diversified portfolios, then each shareholder owns a very small share of 
the firm and is risk neutral at the margin.  
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there is a tradeoff between incentives and insurance. The (second best) optimal contract has 
to find a balance between offering incentives and insuring the agent against wage 
fluctuations.   
 
The Informativeness Principle 
Holmström (1979) shows that the optimal solution to this problem must satisfy the 
“Informativeness Principle” which requires that the wage of the agent should be conditional 
on all observable signals that contain statistical information about the agent’s effort. The 
following example illustrates this principle. Suppose that the profit of a firm depends on the 
effort of its manager but also on other factors such as the business cycle, the exchange rate 
or the prices of raw materials and other input goods. In this case the manager should be 
rewarded for high profits only if these profits are due to his effort but not if they are due to 
favorable business conditions. This implies that the principal should use relative 
performance evaluation (Holmström 1982a). If all firms in the same industry make high 
profits, it is less likely that the high profits of the firm under consideration are due to the 
efforts of the manager as compared to a situation in which his firm is the only one with high 
profits while all other firms are making low profits. In the first case it is more likely that the 
firm’s success is due to favorable business conditions, so the manager should be rewarded 
less than in the second case, where it is more likely that the firm’s success is due to the 
manager’s effort.  
At first glance it may seem counterintuitive that the manager is rewarded or 
punished for events that he cannot control, such as the success of other firms or movements 
in the exchange rate. However, this is necessary in order to better insure the manager 
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against these risks and, at the same time, offering better incentives for those dimensions of 
profits that he does control. Some of the bonus schemes that are observed in the financial 
and other industries violate the Informativeness Principle in multiple ways. They reward 
managers for profits that are due to luck (e.g. profits due to a booming stock market or to 
rising house prices), and they do not punish managers for losses that they are responsible 
for (e.g. legal liabilities due to the violation of financial regulations).  
Holmström (1979) derived the optimal contract by using the so-called “first order 
approach” that replaces the agent’s incentive compatibility condition with the first order 
condition of the agent’s utility maximization problem. This approach is problematic because 
the first order condition is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the optimal 
action of the agent. Whether the agent’s maximization problem is globally concave depends 
on the incentive scheme that is determined endogenously and unknown until the problem 
has been solved. Rogerson (1985) and Jewitt (1988) have shown that fairly strong 
assumptions are required to guarantee that the first order approach always characterizes 
the optimal contract. Furthermore, there is the so-called “Mirrlees problem”. Mirrlees 
(1975) has shown that a solution to the moral hazard problem need not exist if the agent 
chooses the mean of an unbounded probability distribution (such as the normal 
distribution). Furthermore, he shows in a simple example that the principal can approximate 
the first best by offering a contract that pays the agent a fixed wage for almost all 
realizations of profit, but penalizes him heavily if the firm’s profit falls below a very low 
threshold.  
Grossman and Hart (1983) offer a discrete model with finitely many actions and 
outcomes that avoids these technical problems. It proposes a two-step solution algorithm. 
First, for every possible action that the agent may take the cost-minimizing incentive scheme 
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is computed that implements this action at the lowest possible cost to the principal. Each of 
these problems has a solution that can be found using a standard Kuhn-Tucker approach. In 
a second step the action that maximizes the principal’s profit (given the cost to implement it) 
is selected. This discrete model is more rigorous but arguably less elegant and less intuitive 
than the original model by Holmström (1979). 
Grossman and Hart (1983) show that the optimal contract has very few general 
properties. It need not even be the case that the optimal contract is monotonically 
increasing in the profit of the firm. If a higher profit level is associated with a lower hazard 
rate, indicating that it is “less likely” that this profit level was generated by the desired 
action, then the wage of the agent should decrease. This property points to another striking 
implication of the Informativeness Principle.  It requires that the principal rewards the agent 
as if she solves a statistical inference problem. She pays a higher wage if an outcome 
suggests that is more likely that the agent took the desired action. However, in equilibrium 
the agent chooses the desired action with probability one! Thus, the principal knows with 
certainty the action taken by the agent.  
The Informativeness Principle predicts that contracts are very complex because they 
should be contingent on all observable signals that are informative about the agent’s effort, 
such as the profits of other firms in the same industry, the exchange rate, the prices of input 
goods, weather conditions and other factors affecting profits. Furthermore, the functional 
form of the optimal contract depends delicately on the underlying probability distributions 
of these signals. In the real world, however, many contracts are fairly simple. They depend 
on very few variables and have a simple functional form. For example, the wage of a 
production worker often depends linearly on the output he produces, a sharecropper has to 
pay a fixed share of his harvest to the landlord, and a salesman gets a commission that is 
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linear in the number of contracts he sells. As pointed out by the quotes of Hart and 
Holmström (1987) in the introduction this failure to accurately predict real world incentive 
schemes calls the contractual approach into question. 
 
Linear Incentive Schemes and Multiple Tasks 
Holmström and Milgrom (1987) deal with this problem by arguing that contracts need to be 
robust to a richer action space of the agent. The standard principal-agent model considers a 
static situation in which the agent takes an action only once. In contrast, Holmström and 
Milgrom introduce a dynamic principal-agent model in which the agent has a much richer 
action space. First, the agent can move in any direction of an N-dimensional probability 
space. Second, the agent does not choose one action once and for all but rather a time path 
of actions. Thus, the agent can change and adjust his action in reaction to his past 
performance. In the limit, as the length of each time period goes to zero, the agent controls 
the drift rate of an N-dimensional Brownian motion in continuous time.  
This model is far more complex and more difficult to analyze than the standard 
principal-agent model, but the optimal solution is strikingly simple. Holmström and Milgrom 
(1987) show that the optimal incentive scheme in the continuous model is a contract that is 
linear in aggregates, e.g. linear in total profits. The intuition for this result is that any non-
linear incentive scheme would be exploited by the agent. The richer the agent’s action 
space, the more degrees of freedom he has to adjust his actions in such a way that his own 
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utility is increased at the detriment of the principal. The advantage of a linear incentive 
scheme is that if provides a constant incentive pressure that cannot be exploited.
6
  
This is a very important result that calls into question the widespread use of 
discontinuous bonus payments, e.g. the payment of a fixed bonus if a certain performance 
threshold is reached. These bonus contracts are prone to manipulation. For example, a 
salesman who gets a fixed bonus if his sales exceed a certain threshold at the end of the year 
will slack off if the threshold is reached in November already. On the other hand, if he is 
close to the threshold but unlikely to pass it without extraordinary measures, he may try to 
induce additional sales by using expensive rebates at the detriment of his firm. A linear 
bonus scheme discourages this behavior because it offers the same incentive pressure at 
each point in time.  
It is important to note that the model of Holmström and Milgrom (1987) considers an 
agent working in a stationary environment. Thus, it is not suitable for the analysis of the 
optimal contract for a top manager, but rather applies to workers and mid-level employees, 
but also to suppliers, salespeople, and independent contractors who are engaged in a 
stationary production process. The model predicts that the incentive intensity (the slope of 
the incentive scheme) is higher the lower the agent’s risk aversion, the smaller the noise 
term, and the higher the agent’s impact on profits. Furthermore, it predicts that these 
parameters enter the optimal contract in a very simple and intuitive functional form.  
                                                          
6
 In Holmström and Milgrom there is a discontinuity in the limit. In the discrete model, no matter how small 
each time period is, the optimal incentive scheme is still very complex because it is a linear function of N 
different “accounts”, where N could be very large. Only in the limit, as the length of each time period shrinks to 
zero, the optimal contract is linear in one aggregate of these N different accounts (such as total profits). Hellwig 
and Schmidt (2002) show how this discontinuity arises and offer an alternative model in which the limit is 
approached continuously. In their model a contract that is linear in one account is approximately optimal both 
in the discrete model with time periods of finite length and in the continuous model.   
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One empirically testable prediction of the model is that the more risky the outcome 
of the agent’s efforts the lower should be the slope of his incentive scheme. However, it is 
difficult to identify this relationship in empirical data. Some studies find stronger incentives 
when performance measurement is easier (e.g. Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999), while other 
studies find a positive relationship or no correlation at all (e.g. Core, Guay, and Verrecchia, 
2003, Lafontaine, 1992, Allen and Lueck, 1992). There are two possible explanations for this. 
First, there could be a selection bias. If less-risk averse managers self-select into more risky 
occupations, then the riskiness of an occupation may be positively correlated with incentive 
intensity (Chiappori and Salanié, 2003). Second, if the environment is more risky, it may be 
more difficult for the principal to tell the agent what to do. Therefore, the principal may give 
more discretion to the agent which requires to also give him more powerful incentives 
(Prendergast 2002).  
Holmström and Milgrom (1991) extend their model to situations in which the agent is 
engaged in multiple tasks that interact with each other. Tasks can be substitutes or 
complements in the agent’s cost function. Tasks are substitutes if engaging in one task 
becomes more costly the more the agent engages in the other task, and complements, if 
engaging in one task makes the other task easier to carry out. Thus, incentives that are given 
for one task affect the agent’s effort in another task. For example, if a production worker has 
to produce output (task 1) and maintain his machine (task 2) and if producing output and 
maintaining the machine are substitutes in the agent’s cost function, then offering a high 
piece-rate induces the worker to care less for his machinery. This problem is aggravated if it 
is easy to measure output but difficult to measure maintenance. If there was only one task 
(producing output), the agent should be offered high-powered incentives, but with two 
tasks, the piece-rate should be lower. High-powered incentives for producing output would 
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induce the agent to neglect his second task and not to take proper care of the machinery he 
is working with. 
In some situations it may even be optimal to pay a fixed wage and to offer no explicit 
incentives at all. For example, consider the question whether a teacher should be paid 
depending on the performance of his students in standardized tests. These tests measure 
certain skills such as reading, writing, or doing math, and they do provide a signal about the 
teacher’s effort in teaching these skills. Thus, the Informativeness Principle suggests that the 
teacher’s salary should be made contingent on his student’s test scores. However, a teacher 
has to engage in multiple tasks. In addition to teaching basic skills, he also has to develop the 
creativity and the social skills of his students that are much more difficult to measure by 
standardized tests. Thus, if the teacher’s wage would depend on his students’ test scores for 
basic skills, he would focus too much on teaching to the test and neglect developing other 
important skills of his students. On the other hand, if the teacher is offered a fixed wage 
(and if there is some intrinsic motivation), he may work less hard altogether, but he would 
allocate his efforts more efficiently across tasks. Thus, if teaching creativity and social skills is 
sufficiently important, it is better to pay a fixed wage to the teacher. 
Holmström and Milgrom (1991, 1994) extend the multi-task model to show why 
some incentive instruments complement each other and should be used together. For 
example, workers who own (some of) the assets they work with should be offered high-
powered incentives and should be given more discretion in how to do their jobs. Thus, these 
instruments should co-vary positively in cross-sectional data. This has been confirmed 




Moral Hazard in Teams 
Agents often work in teams. In another classical paper Holmström (1982a) discusses the 
incentive problems that arise from team production. There are two main issues. First, if the 
principal does not observe signals on individual performance but only a signal on the 
performance of the team, a public good problem arises. Each agent has an incentive to free-
ride on the efforts of the other team members. Consider the case of a partnership where the 
partners want to set up an incentive scheme to mitigate the free-rider problem. If the sum of 
the payments that can be made to all partners must equal the total profit of the partnership, 
it is impossible to overcome the free-rider problem even if all partners are risk neutral. 
Efficiency requires that each partner is full residual claimant on the margin, but without an 
external “budget breaker” it is impossible to make all partners full residual claimants at the 
same time. With a budget breaker, however, the problem can be solved by a Groves 
mechanism that pays the full profit minus an appropriately chosen lump-sum payment to 
each team member. Holmström suggests that the need for a budget breaker may be the 
reason why many capitalist firms have outside owners (shareholders) who do not spend 
effort but whose main function is to absorb fluctuations of net profits with their wealth.  
A second issue with team production arises if the principal observes signals on 
individual performance of each team member and if these signals are correlated. In this case 
the principal can improve the incentive contract for each team member by using the 
information provided by the other signals, i.e., he can use relative performance evaluation. 
This is common practice in many firms. However, many firms use very specific forms of 
relative performance evaluation, such as rank-order tournaments. For example, in a 
tournament for promotion the agent with the best performance moves up the career ladder 
to a better job while the other agents are not promoted. The problem with rank-order 
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tournaments is that they do not make efficient use of the available information. The 
Informativeness Principle requires that the principal should use all information that is 
informative about the agent’s performance, not just the fact that he performed better than 
all other agents. Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that it may be difficult for the principal to 
credibly commit to a complicated reward structure while it is much simpler to commit to a 
policy that promotes exactly one (or n) agent(s). 
 
Career Concerns 
Employees are not only motivated by direct monetary incentives, they also care about their 
career prospects. Fama (1980) argued that the moral hazard problem may be solved by 
career concerns and that performance-based wage contracts are therefore unnecessary.  
Holmström (1982b) offers the first formal model of career concerns. In his model the output 
produced by an agent in each period depends on the agent’s exogenously given ability, the 
agent’s effort and a noise term. In each period the agent is paid a fixed wage that is 
determined by a perfectly competitive labor market so that firms offer the agent a fixed 
wage that equals his expected productivity in the coming period. All firms observe the 
agent’s past output but do not know which part of the output is due to the agent’s ability, to 
the agent’s effort, and the noise term. Thus, firms have to form beliefs about the agent’s 
ability based on the agent’s past performance, and about the effort that the agent is going to 
choose in the coming period. The agent does not know his ability either, but he observes the 
effort level that he chooses in each period.
7
  
                                                          
7
 Holmström (1982b) assumes that the agent is equally well informed about his own ability as the labor market. 
For example, a PhD student on the job market may be equally well informed about his ability to write good 
papers in the future as his more senior colleagues who evaluate him. Thus, there is symmetric information 
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In the last period the agent gets a fixed wage and the world ends, so he has no 
incentive to spend any effort. Thus, in the last period his expected output is determined by 
his ability alone. In the second to last period the agent anticipates that his wage in the last 
period depends on the labor market’s expectation of his ability. Thus, he has an incentive to 
choose some positive effort level in order to affect the market’s expectation about his 
ability. However, in equilibrium the market perfectly anticipates what the agent is going to 
do. In the third to last (and all previous periods) the same logic applies. The agent works 
harder to affect the market’s expectations in all future periods, but the market rationally 
anticipates his behavior and cannot be fooled.  As a result the agent works very hard at the 
beginning of his career, possibly spending an effort level that is far higher than the first best 
level of effort. Over time his effort level falls because there are fewer and fewer periods left 
that can be affected. The model nicely captures a “rat race effect”. At the beginning of his 
career the agent works very hard in order to impress the market about his ability, but 
because the market expects him to work so hard, it attributes the agent’s output to his high 
effort and not to high ability. Nevertheless the agent cannot reduce his efforts. If he would 
do so (off the equilibrium path) the market would still believe that he worked very hard and 
therefore attribute the lower output to lower ability, resulting in a lower wage in all coming 
periods.  
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) relax the assumption of fixed wages and assume that 
wages may depend linearly on performance. In their model career concerns and 
performance pay interact. They show that a manager at the end of his career is no longer 
motivated by career concerns, so he should get more high-powered performance pay. On 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
about the agent’s ability which simplifies the model considerably. Without this assumption the model would 
turn into a signaling model that is plagued by multiple equilibria. 
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the other hand, managers at the beginning of their career should get low-powered 




III. Incomplete Contracts and Control Rights 
In principal-agent theory the parties write contracts that are contingent on all relevant 
information that is observable and verifiable to the courts. Such a contract is not a complete 
contingent contract (because it is not contingent on the agent’s effort), but it is 
“comprehensive” in the sense that it specifies for each contractible state of the world which 
payments have to be made. Such a contract never has to be renegotiated or completed by 
the courts because all possible contingencies (that can be contracted upon) have been taken 
care of in the original contract.  The Informativeness Principle implies that the optimal 
contract is highly complex and depends on fine details of the underlying probability 
distributions. 
Real world contracts are far more simple and often incomplete. They are not 
contingent on all possible states of the world but have missing provisions and gaps that have 
to be completed over time (as the state of the world materializes) either through 
renegotiation or by the ruling of a court. Grossman and Hart (1986) model incomplete 
contracts by assuming that long-term contingent contracts are not feasible, for example 
because some states of the world are observable by the contracting parties but cannot be 
verified to the courts. If contracts are incomplete, it is of crucial importance who has the 
control right to decide what to do in a contingency not covered by the contract. 
                                                          
8
 There are many other important extensions of Holmström’s career concerns model, including Holmström and 
Ricart I Costa (1986), Stein (1989), Dewatripont et al. (1999a, 1999b), and Persson and Tabellini (2000). 
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Grossman and Hart (1986) distinguish between “specific control rights” and “residual 
control rights”. Specific control rights can be contracted upon and can be assigned to one 
party or the other. If, however, a contingency has not been dealt with by the contract, then 
the party with the residual rights of control decides what is to be done. Residual control 
rights are often property rights. The owner of a physical asset (e.g. a machine, a building, or 
a patent), can decide what to do with the asset in all contingencies that have not been dealt 
with explicitly in the contract. In particular, the owner of an asset can exclude other parties 
from using the asset. Grossman and Hart define a “firm” as the set of physical assets that the 
firm controls. This gives rise to the following fundamental questions: Which physical assets 
should be controlled by a firm, who should own this firm, and under what circumstances 
should a set of assets be divided between two firms rather than be controlled by one firm? 
These questions are at the heart of the theory of the firm. Coase (1937) argued 
informally that some transactions are carried out more efficiently within a firm than 
between firms on a market. Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) pointed out that if contracts are 
incomplete then there are significant transaction costs in using markets. These transaction 
costs include inefficient bargaining and the hold-up problem (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
1978). The hold-up problem arises if parties have to make non-contractible, relationship-
specific investments. These investments are more valuable within a relationship than with 
an external trading partner. Each party has an incentive to invest too little because it 
anticipates correctly that after the investment cost is sunk it will be “held up” by the other 
party and not get the full return of its investment. A possible solution to this problem is 
vertical integration. If two firms merge, than the owner of the integrated firm internalizes all 
costs and benefits of the investments and will invest efficiently.  But this raises the question 
of the boundaries of the firm. Why shouldn’t two firms always merge? Williamson argues 
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informally that there are also transaction costs within firms (e.g. bureaucracy costs that 
increase as firms become bigger). But, this argument does not solve the famous “Williamson 
puzzle”: Williamson (1985) had shown that a merger must always (weakly) increase 
efficiency if the involved parties can engage in “selective intervention”, i.e., if they can leave 
the two original firms as they were before the merger and intervene selectively only if the 
intervention increases total surplus.  
Grossman and Hart (1986) offer a formal model that solves this puzzle. The basic idea 
can be illustrated in a simple example with two parties and two physical assets. Both parties 
can make investments that increase the joint surplus. The investments are “relationship-
specific” in the sense that they are more valuable within the relationship than if the two 
parties split up and trade with some third parties. The problem is that the parties cannot 
write contracts on the investments, nor on how to divide the surplus that is generated by 
the investments. The only contracts that are feasible ex ante (i.e. before the investments can 
be made) are contracts on the allocation of ownership rights.  
After both parties made their relationship-specific investments they have to bargain 
on how to generate and split the surplus that can be generated with the investments. 
Bargaining is assumed to be efficient and to result in the Nash bargaining solution. If both 
assets are owned by one party, then this party has a strong bargaining position because it 
can exclude the other party from using the assets. That is, the threat-point of the owner in 
the Nash bargaining  game becomes stronger while the threat-point of the non-owner 
becomes weaker. Hence, the owner will get a larger share of the surplus and thus has a 
stronger incentive to invest. The other party, that does not own any asset, is in a weak 
bargaining position giving rise to lower investment incentives. Hence, if the relationship 
specific investments of one party are very important while the investments of the other 
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party are not, then the first party should own the assets (integration). If, however, the 
investments of both parties are of similar importance, then it is better that each party owns 
one of the assets (non-integration), so that both parties have at least some investment 
incentives.  
This model derives the benefits and the costs of integration endogenously out of one 
general principle. The benefit of integration is that the owner of the firm has a stronger 
incentive to invest. The cost is that the investment incentives of the non-owner are reduced. 
This model does not only explain under what circumstances integration outperforms non-
integration, it also shows who should be the owner of which assets. Furthermore, the model 
does not need to assume any ex post inefficiencies caused by bargaining frictions or 
bureaucratic decision making.  
The model of Grossman and Hart (1986) is restricted to two parties and does not 
directly apply to large companies with many owners, investors, and employees. Hart and 
Moore (1990) have generalized and extended the model in several directions. They consider 
a model with N parties, K assets and a rich set of possible ownership structures, including 
partnerships, joint-stock companies, supermajority rules, and veto power. They assume that 
ex post bargaining is always efficient (as in Grossman and Hart 1986) and results in a division 
of the ex post surplus that is given by the Shapley value. This model gives rise to a rich set of 
predictions. For example, it shows that complementary assets should be owned together, 
that not more than one party should have veto power over an asset, that if an agent is 
indispensable for an asset, then this agent should own the asset, and that if a group of 
agents is indispensable for a set of assets, then they should control these assets by simple 
majority vote.  
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The “incomplete contracts approach” of Grossman, Hart and Moore has proven to be 
very powerful in explaining the allocation of ownership and control rights in many 
applications. It plays an important role in Corporate Finance, Industrial Organization, 
Organizational Economics, and Political Economy.
9
 Here I will briefly discuss only two 
important applications to which Oliver Hart made major contributions. 
 
Corporate Finance 
The incomplete contracts approach of Grossman, Hart and Moore was particularly important 
in the field of Corporate Finance. Before Grossman and Hart (1986), different financial claims 
such as equity, debt or convertible securities were mainly seen as instruments for minimizing 
taxes and bankruptcy costs. The classical Modigliani-Miller (1958) irrelevance theorem 
shows that in the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs the value of a firm is independent 
of how the firm is financed. However, because of the preferential tax treatment of debt and 
the existence of bankruptcy costs the optimal debt-equity ratio is determined by equating 
the marginal tax benefits of debt and the marginal increase in expected bankruptcy costs 
(Miller 1977).  
This theory ignores the fact that financial claims also differ in how they allocate 
control rights in different states of the world. For example, as long as a firm honors its 
obligations and repays its debt, equity holders are in control and decide what to do with the 
firm. But if the firm is in financial distress, debt holders can seize collateral and may force the 
firm into bankruptcy. In this case equity holders lose control and debt holders take over.  
                                                          
9
 The conference volume edited by Aghion, Dewatripont, Legros and Zingales (2016) offers an excellent survey 
on the impact of the incomplete contracts approach on many different fields.  
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Hart and Moore (1998) consider a model of entrepreneurial finance that explains 
many real world properties of debt contracts including bankruptcy and inefficient liquidation 
of assets. An entrepreneur needs funds from an investor to finance a positive net present 
value project. The problem is that the returns of the project are not verifiable. The 
entrepreneur can divert project returns into his own pocket, but he cannot divert the firm’s 
physical assets. In the optimal contract the entrepreneur promises to make a fixed stream of 
payments to the investor. As long as he does so, he runs the project, but if he defaults the 
investor has the right to seize and liquidate the project’s assets which is inefficient. At that 
stage the parties can renegotiate the initial contract, but they may be unable to avoid 
liquidation if the investor cannot commit to return a sufficiently high share of future profits 
to the investor.  Hart and Moore (1994) develop a closely related model in which the 
manager cannot commit not to leave the firm and withdraw his human capital. This gives 
rise to hold-up problem that limits the total indebtedness of the entrepreneur to the 
investor at any point in time. Again, the second-best optimal contract closely resembles 
typical real-world debt contracts. 
Hart and Moore (1995) consider the financial structure of a publicly held firm that is 
run by a manager who has only a small financial stake in the company but large private 
benefits from control. In particular, the manager is assumed to be an empire builder who 
will undertake a new investment opportunity even if the investment has a negative net 
present value. In this situation senior (long-term) debt plays a crucial role in constraining the 
manager to raise new funds. If the company has too little long-term debt the manager can 
easily raise money to fund new projects even if they are not profitable. In this case there will 
be overinvestment. On the other hand, if there is too much outstanding long-term debt, the 
manager is unable to finance a project even if it has a positive net present value (Myers’ 
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(1977) debt overhang problem). This tradeoff determines the optimal level of long-term 
debt. Furthermore, it is shown under what conditions multiple classes of debt with different 
seniorities and covenants allowing limited dilution can be optimal. 
There is a large literature on corporate finance building on the incomplete contracts 
approach including Aghion and Bolton (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990, 1996) and many others. An excellent synthesis of the early literature is 
given by Hart (1995).   
The incomplete contracts approach focuses on the control and decision rights of 
different parties in different states of the world. Thus, the legal environment that defines the 
rights and obligations of the parties if the firm goes bankrupt is very important. Hart has 
made several suggestions on how to reform bankruptcy procedures and other legal financial 
institutions (see Aghion et al. 1992, Hart et al. 1997).   
 
Privatization 
If comprehensive contracts could be written, there would be no difference between a 
nationalized firm and privatized firm that is regulated by the government. Any incentive 
scheme for the manager (and the workers) of a nationalized firm could be replicated by a 
comprehensive contract in the regulated private firm, and vice versa. Thus, to understand 
the costs and benefits of privatization it has to be recognized that contracts are incomplete. 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider a firm that can invest in quality improvements and 
cost reductions. Quality improvements give rise to higher costs, and cost reductions give rise 
to lower quality. The problem is that neither quality improvements nor cost reductions are 
ex ante contractible.  The owner-manager of a privatized firm does not need the permission 
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of the government to implement a cost reduction, but he does have to negotiate with the 
government to implement quality improvements. Thus, he gets all the benefits form a cost 
reduction (without internalizing the negative externality due to lower quality) but only some 
fraction of the benefits from quality improvements. Therefore, he will invest too much in 
cost reduction and too little in quality improvement. The manager of a nationalized 
company, on the other hand, needs government approval for both types of investment. 
Furthermore, the government can threaten to replace him which weakens his bargaining 
position. Thus, he will invest too little both in quality improvements and in cost reductions. 
The model predicts that privately owned companies will produce at lower cost, but they will 
sometimes also offer lower quality than nationalized firms. Thus, if quality improvements are 
not an issue while cost control is very important, a company should be privately owned. If 
however, non-contractible quality is a major concern (as in schools, law enforcement, 
prisons, and perhaps some parts of public infrastructure) then it may be better to have 
public ownership.
10
   
 
Foundations of Incomplete Contracts 
The incomplete contracts approach has been criticized because it relies on the strong 
assumption that the only long-term contracts that can be written are contracts on the 
allocation of property rights. Why isn’t it possible to write a long-term contract, e.g. a 
contract on trade, that is non-contingent? Such a contract may have to be renegotiated with 
                                                          
10
 Schmidt (1996) offers a different incomplete contracts model on the costs and benefits of privatization that is 
based on the idea that residual rights of control give privileged access to information inside the firm. In his 
model the government is better informed about the cost of a publicly owned company than of a privatized 
company. This gives rise to a soft budget constraint: If a publicly owned firm fails to reduce its cost the 
government observes the firm’s cost and chooses the ex post efficient production level, but this reduces the 
incentives for cost reduction. If the firm is privately owned the government does not observe the firm’s cost. 
Thus it will reduce the production level in order to reduce the firm’s information rent. This hard budget 
constraint is ex post inefficient, but it gives stronger cost saving incentives ex ante.  
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a high probability after the realization of the state of the world, but it could be useful to 
induce the parties to invest more efficiently. Hart and Moore (1988) propose a model that 
allows for such contracts. This model does not have ownership rights, but it does have 
relationship specific investments and ex post efficient renegotiation. Hart and Moore show 
that this model gives rise to similar effects as the Grossman and Hart (1986) model. In 
particular, it is impossible to induce both parties to invest efficiently. However, Nöldeke and 
Schmidt (1995) show that this model crucially depends on the assumption that if trade fails 
the courts cannot distinguish whether the seller refused to deliver or the buyer refused to 
take delivery. Without this assumption simple option contracts can be used to implement 
efficient investments. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) also show that the first best can 
be achieved if it is possible ex ante to allocate all the bargaining power to one party. On the 
other hand Che and Hausch (1999) show that it is impossible to achieve efficient investments 
if the investments are “co-operative”, i.e., if the seller’s investment increases the buyer’s 
benefit of the good and the buyer’s investment reduces the seller’s cost of producing it.  
Maskin and Tirole (1999) raise an even more fundamental issue. In Grossman and 
Hart (1986) all parties are symmetrically informed and share the same expectations about 
future states of the world, but they are unable to specify all possible contingencies in a 
contract, for example because the contingencies cannot be described or verified to the 
courts. However, if the parties correctly anticipate their payoffs in the different states of the 
world, then it is possible to construct a revelation mechanism that induces them to 
announce the state of the world truthfully. Such a mechanism can be used to implement the 
first best efficient allocation independently of the allocation of ownership rights.  
Hart and Moore (1999) argue that the Maskin-Tirole mechanism requires that the 
parties can commit not to renegotiate the outcome of the mechanism. They offer an 
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example (based on Segal 1999) in which the efficient allocation cannot be implemented if 
renegotiation cannot be excluded.  
The debate on the theoretical foundations of incomplete contracts is not yet settled. 
Sophisticated revelation mechanisms such as the one proposed by Maskin and Tirole (1999) 
are not observed in the real world, but we do not yet understand why. One possible answer 
is that these mechanisms are very sensitive to small changes in the informational structure. 
For example, Aghion et al. (2012) show that subgame perfect implementation (Moore and 
Repullo, 1988) relies on a very strong common knowledge assumption. Small information 
perturbations are sufficient to induce non-truthful revelation and undesirable outcomes. An 
alternative explanation is offered by behavioral economics.  In fact, Oliver Hart contributed 
to this literature as well. 
Contracts as Reference Points 
Hart and Moore (2008) and Hart (2009) develop a behavioral model of incomplete contracts 
that is not prone to the critique of Maskin and Tirole (1999). Furthermore, this model 
introduces ex post inefficient outcomes. Hart and Moore (2008) argue that the traditional 
incomplete contracts approach which assumes that the parties always reach an ex post 
efficient outcome is ill-suited to studying the internal organization of firms. The traditional 
model can explain inefficient relationship-specific investments. But if the parties always end 
up on the ex post efficiency frontier, “it is hard to see why authority, hierarchy, delegation, 
or indeed anything apart from asset ownership matters” (Hart and Moore, 2008, p. 3).  
Hart and Moore (2008) posit that contracts form reference points that shape the 
feelings of entitlement of the involved parties. They assume that each party feels entitled to 
the best possible outcome that is consistent with the contract. If a party does not get what 
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she feels entitled to, she is aggrieved and shades in non-contractible ways. Shading reduces 
the payoff of the other party but is costless for the shader. Hart and Moore compare a rigid 
contract to a flexible contract. The benefit of flexibility is that the contract can be better 
adjusted to the realization of the state of the world, but the cost is that it yields 
aggrievement and shading. This tradeoff explains the optimal degree of contractual 
flexibility.
11
 Hart (2009) extends this model to allow for asset ownership, Hart and 
Holmström (2010) use it to explain the allocation of decision rights and firm scope. Fehr, 
Hart and Zehnder (2009, 2011, 2015) and Bartling and Schmidt (2015) offer some 
experimental evidence showing that contracts form reference points that affect behavior.  
 
IV. Other Contributions 
In addition to the work that the Nobel committee honored with the Nobel Memorial Prize, 
Hart and Holmström made many other important contributions. In his dissertation, Hart 
(1974, 1975) provided the foundation for the theory of incomplete markets that plays an 
important role in general equilibrium theory. There is a large literature on incomplete 
markets that is based on his early work. Furthermore, he wrote influential papers on 
monopolistic competition (Hart 1979 and 1982), on adverse selection in labor markets 
(Grossman and Hart 1983b), on the market for corporate control (Grossman and Hart 1980), 
and on the incentive effects of competition (Hart 1983). Holmström wrote extensively on 
liquidity in financial markets and the implications for regulation (Holmström and Tirole 1993, 
1997, 1998, 2001, 2011). In his most recent work he studies the impact of market 
transparency on liquidity (Dang et al. 2015).  
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 Herweg and Schmidt (2015) develop a related model of inefficient renegotiations that also assumes that 
contracts form reference points but that is based on loss aversion, a behavioral bias that is well established in 




Aggarwal, Rajesh K, and Andrew A Samwick (1999): “The Other Side of the Trade-off: The 
Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation,” Journal of Political Economy, 107, 65–105. 
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton (1992): “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial 
Contracting,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 473–494. 
Aghion, Philippe., Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Legros and Luigi Zingales, eds. (2016): The 
Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Aghion, Philippe, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey (1994): “Renegotiation Design with 
Unverifiable Information,” Econometrica, 62, 257–282. 
Aghion, Philippe, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, and Olivier Tercieux 
(2012): “Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 127, 1843–1881. 
Aghion, Philippe, Oliver Hart, and John Moore (1992): “The Economics of Bankruptcy 
Reform,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 8, 523–546. 
Allen, Douglas, and Dean Lueck (1992): “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent 
versus Cropshare,” Journal of Law and Economics, 35, 397–426. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963): “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” 
American Economic Review, 53, 941–973. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1968): “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment,” American 
Economic Review, 58, 537–539. 
Bartling, Björn, and Klaus M. Schmidt (2015): “Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness 
in Contract Renegotiations,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 13, 98–129. 
Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005): Contract Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Bolton, Patrick, and David S. Scharfstein (1990): “A Theory of Predation Based on Agency 
Problems in Financial Contracting,” American Economic Review, 80, 93–106. 
Bolton, Patrick, and David S. Scharfstein (1996): “Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of 
Creditors,” Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1–25. 
Che, Yeon-Koo, and Donald B. Hausch (1999): “Cooperative Investments and the Value of 
Contracting,” American Economic Review, 89, 125–147. 
Chiappori, Pierre-André, and Bernard Salanié (2003): “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey and 
Some Recent Work,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics - Theory and 
Applications, Eighth World Congress, ed. by M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, and S. J. 
Turnovsky: Cambridge University Press, 115–149. 
Coase, Ronald H. (1937): “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4, 386–405. 
Core, John E., Wayne R. Guay, and Robert E. Verrecchia (2003): “Price versus Non-Price 
Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts,” Accounting Review, 78, 
957–981. 
Dang, Tri V., Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmström (2015): “Ignorance, Debt, and Financial 
Crises,” mimeo, MIT. 
29 
 
Dewatripont, Mathias, Ian Jewitt, and Jean Tirole (1999): “The Economics of Career 
Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies,” 
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 199–217. 
Dewatripont, Mathias, and Jean Tirole (1994): “A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of 
Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 
1027–1054. 
Fama, Eugene F. (1980): “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Political 
Economy, 88, 288–307. 
Fehr, Ernst, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder (2009): “Contracts, Reference Points, and 
Competition-Behavioral Effects of The Fundamental Transformation,” Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 7, 561–572. 
Fehr, Ernst, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder (2011): “Contracts as Reference Points - 
Experimental Evidence,” American Economic Review, 101, 493–525. 
Fehr, Ernst, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder (2015): “How Do Informal Agreements and 
Revision Shape Contractual Reference Points?,” Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 13, 1–28. 
Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin J. Murphy (1992): “Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence 
of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468–505. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver Hart (1980): “Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and 
the Theory of the Corporation,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42–64. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver Hart (1983a): “An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,” 
Econometrica, 51, 7–45. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver Hart (1983b): “Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric 
Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 123–156. 
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver Hart (1986): “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A 
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691–719. 
Hart, Oliver (1974): “On the Existence of Equilibrium in a Securities Model,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 9, 293–311. 
Hart, Oliver (1975): “On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Sstructure is 
Incomplete,” Journal of Economic Theory, 11, 418–443. 
Hart, Oliver (1979): “Monopolistic Competition in a Large Economy with Differentiated 
Commodities,” The Review of Economic Studies, 46, 1–30. 
Hart, Oliver (1982): “A Model of Imperfect Competition with Keynesian Features,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 97, 109–138. 
Hart, Oliver (1983a): “The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,” Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14, 366–382. 
Hart, Oliver (1983b): “Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An 
Introduction,” Review of Economic Studies, 50, 3–35. 
Hart, Oliver (1995): Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hart, Oliver (2009): “Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 124, 267–300. 
30 
 
Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström (1987): “The Theory of Contracts,” in Advances in 
Economic Theory: Papers Presented at Symposia of the Fifth World Congress of the 
Econometric Society, ed. by T. F. Bewley. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Hart, Oliver, and Bengt Holmström (2010): “A Theory of Firm Scope,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 125, 483–513. 
Hart, Oliver, Rafael La Porta Drago, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and John Moore (1997): “A 
New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions,” European Economic Review, 41, 
461–473. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1988): “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” 
Econometrica, 56, 755–785. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal 
of Political Economy, 98, 1119–1158. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1994): “A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human 
Capital,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841–879. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1995): “Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard 
Claims in Constraining Management,” American Economic Review, 85, 567–585. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1998): “Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of 
Debt,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1–41. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1999): “Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,” Review of 
Economic Studies, 66, 115–138. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (2008): “Contracts as Reference Points,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 123, 1-48. 
Hart, Oliver, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1997): “The Proper Scope of 
Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 
1127–1161. 
Hellwig, Martin F., and Klaus M. Schmidt (2002): “Discrete-Time Approximation of the 
HoImström-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision,” 
Econometrica, 70, 2225–2264. 
Herweg, Fabian, and Klaus M. Schmidt (2015): “Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation,” 
Review of Economic Studies, 82, 297–332. 
Holmström, Bengt (1979): “Moral Hazard and Observability,” Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 
74–91. 
Holmström, Bengt (1982a): “Moral Hazard in Teams,” Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 324–
340. 
Holmström, Bengt (1982b): “Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective,” in 
Essays in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, ed. by Swedish School of Economics. Helsinki, reprinted 
in Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1999), 169–182. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom (1987): “Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of 
Intertemporal Incentives,” Econometrica, 55, 303–328. 
31 
 
Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom (1991): “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive 
Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
7, 24–52. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom (1994): “The Firm as an Incentive System,” American 
Economic Review, 84, 972–991. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Joan Ricard I. Costa (1986): “Managerial Incentives and Capital 
Management,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 835–860. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole (1993): “Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 101, 678–709. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole (1997): “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and 
the Real Sector,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 663–691. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole (1998): “Private and Public Supply of Liquidity,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 106, 1–40. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole (2001): “LAPM: A Liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model,” 
The Journal of Finance, 56, 1837–1867. 
Holmström, Bengt, and Jean Tirole (2011): Inside and Outside Liquidity. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
Ichniowski, Casey, and Kathryn Shaw (2003): “Beyond Incentive Pay: Insiders' Estimates of 
the Value of Complementary Human Resource Management Practices,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 17, 155–180. 
Innes, Robert D. (1990): “Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action 
choices,” Journal of Economic Theory, 52, 45–67. 
Jewitt, Ian (1988): “Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems,” 
Econometrica, 56, 1177–1190. 
Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian (1978): “Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law & 
Economics, 21, 297–326. 
Laffont, Jean-Jaques, and David Martimort (2002): The Theory of Incentives. The Principal-
Agent Model. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lafontaine, Francine (1992): “Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results,” 
RAND Journal of Economics, 23, 263–283. 
Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen (1981): “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841–864. 
Maskin, Eric, and Jean Tirole (1999): “Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts,” 
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114. 
Miller, Merton H. (1977): “Debt and Taxes,” Journal of Finance, 32, 261–275. 
Mirrlees, James A. (1975): “TheTheory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behavior, Part I,” 
mimeo, reprinted in Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1999), 3–21. 
Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller (1958): “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment,” American Economic Review, 48, 261–297. 
32 
 
Moore, John, and Rafael Repullo (1988): “Subgame Perfect Implementation,” Econometrica, 
56, 1191–1220. 
Myers, Stewart C. (1977): “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5, 147–175. 
Nöldeke, Georg, and Klaus M. Schmidt (1995): “Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A 
Solution to the Hold-Up Problem,” RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 163–179. 
Pauly, Mark V. (1968): “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment,” American Economic 
Review, 58, 531–537. 
Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2000): Political Economics, Explaining Economic Policy. 
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press. 
Prendergast, Canice (2002): “The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives,” Journal of 
Political Economy, 110, 1071–1102. 
Rogerson, William P. (1985): “The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems,” 
Econometrica, 53, 1357–1367. 
Schmidt, Klaus M. (1996): “The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts 
Approach,” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 12, 1–24. 
Segal, Ilya (1999): “Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts,” 
Review of Economic Studies, 66, 57–82. 
Shavell, Steven (1979): “Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship,” 
Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 55–73. 
Stein, Jeremy C. (1989): “Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic 
Corporate Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 655–669. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A 
Study in the Economics of Internal Organization. New York, London: Free Press; Collier 
Macmillan. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1979): “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations,” The Journal of Law & Economics, 22, 233–261. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1985): The economic institutions of capitalism. Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. New York, NY: Free Press. 
 
 
 
